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The Relation of the Patent Law
to the Federal Anti-Trust Laws
HoRAcE R. LAMB*

The historical precedents for the modem patent statute and the
existing federal anti-trust laws may be found in the English law
during the reign of the Tudors, particularly Elizabeth and James I.
During this period, as well as prior thereto, it was the practice of the
crown to grant various types of monopolies in the exercise of the
absolute prerogative to regulate all the affairs of the subjects, including the right to engage in trade and commerce. The monopolies
thus granted covered a wide variety of activities, including importing
and exporting of particular commodities, and the right to engage in
trade and manufacture in specific articles.' Many of the monopoly
grants made by the crown, particularly those to "merchant guilds",
had for their object the inducement of the subjects to engage in trade.
Eventually, however, these grants became the subject of abuses and
were made in consideration of money paid or services rendered to the
crown. The monopolies thus granted were not for the purpose of
inducing the recipient to engage in trade, but were obtained purely
2
for resale to others for a price.
The abuse of the monopoly grants from the crown reached its
height during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, when it is said that most
of the common articles of consumption were under the control of
holders of monopolies.3 In the year 6oi, a bill was proposed in
Parliament to abolish monopolies. The Queen then issued a procla*Of the New York Bar. Now special assistant to the Attorney General of the
United
States.
1
HUME, HISTORY OF ENGLAND, ch. xliv, 174; I. ROBINSON, PATENTS (1890)
ch. I. In law the term "monopoly" originally meant a grant by the sovereign
"of or for the sole buying, selling, making, working or using of anything, whereby
any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate are sought to be restrained of
any freedom or liberty that they had before or hindered in their lawful trade."
COKF, 3RD INSTITUTE, c. 85, 181.
2
WM. HYDE PRICE, THE ENGLISH PATENTS OF MONOPOLY (1906) chap. I.

Jones, HistoricalDevelopment of the Law of Business Competition (1926) 35 YALE
L. J. 9o5, 93o.
3ROBINSON, op. cit. supra, note I, sec. 6.
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mation which declared void some monopoly grants and decreed that
any subjects, finding themselves "grieved, injured or wronged" by
any of the grants remaining in force, might have their remedy in the
Queen's Bench. In her "Golden Speech to Her Last Parliament,"
in explanation of her belief that the grants had been "for the good and
avail of my subjects generally, th6ugh a private gain to some of my
ancient servants, who have deserved weld," the good Queen is reported
to have added:
"But that my grant shall be made grievances to my people,
and oppressions to be privileged under color
of our patents,
''4
our princely dignity shall not suffer it.

In the famous case of Darcy v. Allin,5 which was an action on the
case for the infringement of a patent granted by Queen Elizabeth for
the exclusive making, importing and selling of playing cards for
twenty-one years throughout the realm, counsel for the infringer
argued that the crown had no power to grant such a monopoly at
common law. It was conceded, though, that monopoly grants for
new inventions were an exception to the general rule. In the course
of his argument counsel stated:
"Now, therefore, I will show you how the judges have heretofore allowed of monopoly patents, which is, that where any
man by his own charge and industry or by his own wit or invention doth bring any new trade into the realm, or any engine
tending to the furtherance of a trade that never was used before-and that for the good of the realm-that in such cases
the King may grant to him a monopoly patent for some reasonable time, until the subjects may learn the same, in consideration of the good that he doth bring by his invention to the
Commonwealth; otherwise not."
The statement of this argument was probably among the earliest
assertions of the right of every subject to freedom of trade, relieved
of the restraint of a patent monopoly. At the same time it was also
a recognition of the survival of the royal prerogative to grant
monopolies for new inventions. The court adopted the argument
of the defendant and held that the monopoly in playing cards was
void under the common law, because their manufacture furnished employment to the subjects, and an exclusive grant to trade therein was
against the liberty and benefit of the subjects. The court regarded
4The full text is printed as appendix K in PRICE, THE

ENGLISH PATENTS OF

oP. Cit. supra note 2.
6(I6O2) ii Coke 84 B. The argument of counsel in this case appears in Noy,
Reports and Cases Taken in the Time of Queen Elizabeth, King James and King
Charles (1650), 173; reprinted in 74 English Reports, Full Reprint, Kings Bench,
Book 3, P. 11316Darcy v. Allin, supra note 5.
MONOPOLY,
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such monopolies as not only prejudicial to the traders who were
excluded from dealing in that particular article, but also harmful
to the public, because their inseparable incidents are (i) raising of
prices, (2) a deterioration in quality, and (3)the impoverishment of
the excluded traders.
In :624, during the regin of James I, the famous Statute of Monopolies was passed. This Statute was declaratory of the common law
that grants of letters patent
"For the sole buying, selling, making, working or using of
anything within this realm or the Dominion or Wales, or of
any other monopolies .. . are altogether contrary to the laws
of this realm, and so are and shall be utterly void, and of noneffect, and in no wise to be put in use or execution."
The statute then contained this notable exception:
"Provided, nevertheless, and be it declared and enacted:
That any declaration before mentioned shall not extend to any
letters patent and grants of privilege for the term of one and
twenty years or under, heretofore made of the sole working or
making or any manner of new manufacture, within this realm,
to the first and true inventor or inventors . ...
There was also a similar exception covering letters patent for a
term of fourteen years "hereafter to be made" and relating to new
inventions.
A condition which was added to each of the exceptions must also
be noted, because it indicates something of the original understanding
of the relation of the law against monopolies to patents for new
inventions. The condition accompanying the exceptions, reads as
follows:
"So they be not contrary to the law nor mischievous to the
state, by raising of the prices of commodities at home or hurt
of trade, or generally inconvenient ...
From this it will be seen that the provisions of the Statute of
Monopolies related to two separate classes of monopolies: first, those
which restricted the right to trade in some well known branch of
industry or commerce to particular individuals or corporations, and,
72I James I, ch. 3; HUME op. cit. supra note I, 335, commenting on the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies says: "Advantage was also taken of the
present good agreement between the King and Parliament [the King needed
money from Parliament to carry on a war with Spain] in order to pass the bill
against monopolies, which had formerly been encouraged by the King, but which
had failed by the rupture between him and the last House of Commons. This bill
was conceived in such terms as to render it merely declaratory; and all monopolies
were condemned as contrary to law and to the known liberties of the people.
It was there supposed, that every subject of England had entire power to dispose
of his own actions, provided he did no injury to any of his fellow-subjects; and
that no prohibition of the King, no power of any magistrate, nothing but the
authority alone of laws could restrain that unlimited freedom."
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secondly, those which conferred exclusive rights on the inventors of
a "new manufacture" or the introducers of a new trade into the
realm. Monopolies of the first class developed into oppressive
privileges and were held void by the courts, because in violation of
the common law, and, in accordance with the principles of Magna
Charta, they were nothing more than a royal usurpation of power.
Monopolies of the second class, that is, patents for new inventions,
were sustained by the courts even prior to the Statute of Monopolies,
and were regarded as a legitimate exercise of the royal prerogative. 8
Eventually, these monopolies acquired legal sanction by virtue of a
fiction that the transaction was in the nature of a contract under
which a grant was made in consideration of an immediate disclosure
of something new and useful to the realm.9
The early hostility to monopolies in England, evidenced by the
Statute of Monopolies, was renewed in the American colonies as a
result of the abuses of the patents of monopoly granted to English
companies engaged in colonial trade. This hostility was one of the
immediate causes of the Boston Tea Party, when a cargo of tea of an
English company, to whom a monopoly in this commodity had been
granted, was dumped in the Boston Harbor. 0 This resentment
against monopolies in the colonies increased during the Revolution,
because of the monopolistic practices of local tradesmen." So strong
was the belief in the prohibition of monopolies "as contrary to the
spirit of a free government" that it was included in the declaration
2
of rights in some of the first state constitutions.
From time to time many of the states have enacted so-called antimonopoly statutes to curb abuses which menaced free trade in the
states. 3 Finally, in i8go, Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust
8HYDE op. cit. supra note 2, ch. I, points out that the patents of monopoly as a form of industrial encouragement, on the continent, at least, is
believed to have preceded those based on the introduction of a new art. As
early as 1467 a monopoly was granted for the manufacture and sale of paper in
Berne and its jurisdictions. The industrial grants were developed in France
before they were introduced in England. The practice of the early Tudor monarchs was to grant industrial patents to protect foreign workmen introducing
new arts in England. The earliest exclusive patent of this character in England
bears the date 1558. In the latter part of the sixteenth century patents were no
longer wholly confined to new arts and the abuses crept in.

9Ewing, Bearing of the Contract Theory of Patents on Certain Defenses (1914),

an address delivered by the Commissioner of Patents at the 37th Annual Meeting
of 1the American Bar Association, held at Washington, D. C., October, 1914.
Jones, op. cit. supra note 2; (1926) 36 YALE, L. J. 42, 52, 55.
"Jones, op. cit. supra note IO.
12jones, op. cit. supra note IO.
n3n 1889 and 189o the states of Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan and

Texas enacted statutes prohibiting combinations of corporations in restraint of
trade. Almost all states now have laws against monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade. DAvIES, TRUST LAWS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (1915) Ch. IV.
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Act, 14 pursuant to the constitutional power to regulate interstate
commerce. This Act and the Clayton Act 5 constitute the principal
federal anti-trust statutes.
The exceptions, contained in the Statute of Monopolies, relating
to letters patent for new inventions, to which reference has previously
been made, are represented in our modem federal law by the provisions of Article i, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, which gives Congress
power to promote "the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for Limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;" and in the
patent statute,16 which provides that "every patent shall contain
a ... grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of
seventeen years of the exclusive right to make, use and vend the
invention or discovery throughout the United States, and the territories thereof, referring to the specifications for the particulars thereof."

II
The purpose of the Sherman Act was to preserve competition.7
At the time of the adoption of this Act, it was believed that interstate
commerce was being interfered with by powerful trusts and corporate
combinations, with which the anti-monopoly statutes of the several
states were unable to deal, because the operations of the great trusts
and combinations extended beyond state lines.'
An additional
necessity for the adoption of the Sherman Act was the absence of any
common law of crimes in the federal courts. 9 The Sherman Act
1426 Stat. 209 (1890) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1918) § 8820, 8821. The first and second sections of the Sherman Act, which are the sections bearing on this discussion,
are as follows: "Section I. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person
who shall make any such contract or engage in anysuch combination or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall
be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
"Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court."
'538 Stat. 730, (1914), as amended May 15, 1916 and May 26, 1920; U. S.
Comp. Stat. (i918) § 8835. COU. S. Rev. Stat. (1874) sec. 4884; U. S. Comp. Stat. (I918) § 9428.
17U. S. v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U. S. I (I9IO).
1821 Cong. Rec. Part 3, 5ist Cong. 1st Session (1890) 2455, 2460, 2462.
"Senator Vest and Senator Hoar stated in the course of the debates in the
Senate that there was no common law of the United States as there was in all of
the states of the Union. 21 Cong. Rec. Part 3, supra note 16, 2603, and part 4,
3152. See also WALKER, HisToRY OF THE SHERMAN LAW (I910). For a general
discussion see BURDicK,
sec. 133.

THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTION

(1922),
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made unlawful and punishable those monopolies which were void at
common law. In one of the earliest decisions under the Sherman Act,
it was held that the statute was declaratory of the common law. 20
Frequently reference is made to a so-called conflict between the
Sherman Act and the patent law. Such expressions indicate a failure
to appreciate that the legal rights under the patent statute constitute
a valid exception to the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, to the same
extent that letters-patent for new inventions were excepted in the
ancient Statute of Monopolies. In the debates in the Senate on the
Sherman Act, it was said by Senator Sherman:
"It is the unlawful combination, tested by the rules of common
law and human experience, that is aimed at by this bill, and
not the lawful and useful combination. . . . A limited monopoly, secured by a patent right, is an admitted exception.
For this is the2only way by which the inventor can be paid for
his invention." '
The absence of any real conflict between these two laws, when properly
applied to their respective fields, may be developed by reference to
some of the decisions in the federal courts in cases in which this
apparent controversy has been waged.
Generally speaking, it may be said that there have been two main
classes of cases, in which the Supreme Court has been called upon
to decide whether the exercise of rights, claimed to exist by virtue of
a patent, have been so extended as to make the parties liable for their
acts under the rules of the general law, of which the Sherman Act is,
of course, a part. The first class includes cases in which the patentee
has attemtped to restrict the use of his patent with an unpatented
accessory. The second class of cases involves the right to fix the
price at which a patented article may be resold.
The first case which raised the question of the right to limit the use
of a patent with an unpatented accessory, was the so called "ButtonFastener case."22 In this case, Judge Lurton, (then a Judge of the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit) held that the owner
of a patented machine for fastening buttons to shoes with metallic
fasteners might sell such machines, subject to a condition that they
be used only with fasteners manufactured by the seller of the machine.
The rule of this case was later followed by the Supreme Court in the
Dick Mimeograph case,23 in which the opinion was also written by
20

Opinion of Taft, Circuit judge, in U. S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Company,
271 (C.C.A. 6th 1898).
212 1 Cong. Rec. Part 3, supra note 18, 2457.
(Italics are the writer's.)
i2Heaton..Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed.
288 (C.C.A. 6th 1896).

et al., 85 Fed.

=Henry v. A. B. Dick Company

224

U. S. 1,

32

Sup. Ct. 364

(1912).
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Mr. Justice Lurton. Both of these cases were decided on the broad
principle that a patentee may license another to use the patent, subject to any qualifications in respect of time, place, manner or purpose
of use which the licensee agrees to accept.
Five years after the decision in the Dick Mimeograph case, the
same question, this time involving the right to restrict the use of a
patented moving picture machine to unpatented films, was again
presented to the Supreme Court in the Motion Picture Film case.2
In an opinion written by Mr. Justice Clarke, the Supreme Court
expressly overruled the Dick case, and refused to adopt the doctrine
of the Button-Fastenercase. This change of attitude on the part of
the Supreme Court with respect to the limitation on the use of a
patent with an unpatented article, indicated in the Motion Picture
Film case, has a particularlyimportant bearing on the relation between
the patent law and the Sherman law, and for this reason it will later
be considered more fully.
The second group of cases have to do with the right of a patentee
or his assignee to fix the price at which the patented article may be
sold. The most recent case in this group is United States v. General
Electric Company, et al,26 in which the Supreme Court expressly held
that the old case of Bement v. National Harrow Company27 had not
been overruled by subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court.&
The Bement case2 9 was an action for breach of a license agreement
in which the licensee agreed to sell at the prices fixed by the licensor.
Among other defenses, the defendant pleaded that the agreements
between the parties violated the Sherman Act, and in fact this defense
raised the only federal question by which the case was taken to the
United States Supreme Court on a writ of error from the New York
24

Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502,
Sup. Ct. 46 (1917).

37

n0ther cases in the Supreme Court involving a restriction on the use of a
patent, as well as other questions arising under the Sherman Act and the patent
law, are: Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. U. S. 226 U. S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9 (1912);
U. S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. et al. 247 U. S. 32, 38 Sup. Ct. 473 (2918);
and United Shoe Machinery Corp. et al. v. U. S. 258 U. S. 451, 42 Sup. Ct. 363
(I922).
,U. S.

SUP. Ct. Oct. 1, 1926, No. 113.
"'186
U.
S. 70, 22 Sup. Ct. 747 (2902).
2
8Other cases of price-fixing in relation to patents are: Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
J. Par
D & ons CO., 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376 (2922), where the
to a secret process; Virtue v.
inapplicable
"was held Campany
of a patent
protetion
Manufacturing
et al., 227 U.S. 8, 33 Sup. Ct. 2o2
Creamery Package
(I93); Bauerv. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. I,33 Sup. Ct. 626 (93); Straus v. American Publishers Association, 232 U. S. 222, 34 Sup. Ct. 84 (2923); Straus v. Victor
Talking Machine Campany, 243 U. 5. 490, 37 Sup. Ct. 422 (2927); and Boston

Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Ca., 246 U. 5. 8, 38 Sup. Ct. 257

the copyright law and the Sherman Act.
("p8)Supra
which
noteinvolved
27.
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Court of Appeals. In opposition to this defense, the plaintiff contended that only the Attorney General of the United States could
bring an action under the Act, excepting that by section 7 any person

injured in his business or property might himself sue in the District
Court.30 In answer to this, the Supreme Court held that anyone sued
on a contract might set up as a defense that the contract violated the

Sherman Act, and if this was found to be so it would be a good defense
to the action.
Commenting on the patent laws, Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking

for the Supreme Court, said :"'
"The very object of these laws (the patent laws) is monopoly,
and the rule is, with few exceptions, that any conditions which
are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of
property imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee
for the right to manufacture or use or sell the article, will be
upheld by the courts. The fact that the conditions in the
contracts keep up the monopoly or fix prices does not render
them illegal."
By his reference to "conditions illegal in their very nature", the
learned Justice indicated what may be said to be one important
distinction between contracts which may be lawful under the patent
laws, and those falling within the provisions of the Sherman Act.2
For a time the view was entertained that the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Bement casen had in effect been reversed by the
4
decision of the Supreme Court in the Motion Picture Film case,3
because, in deciding the Bement case, the court had referred to and
quoted from the opinion in the Button-Fastenercase. As has pre3

OSection 7 of the Sherman Act provides: "Any person who shall be injured in
his business or property by any other person or corporation, by reason of anything
forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this Act, may sue therefor in any circuit
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is
found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
31i86 U. S. 70, 91, 22 Sup. Ct. 747 (1902). (Italics are the writer's.)
32This distinction is consistent with the rule which it is believed is applicable in
all cases arising under the Sherman Act. This rule is tersely stated in Nash v.
United States,

229

Supra note

24.

U.S. 373, 375, 33 Sup. Ct. 780 (1913) as follows.

"

...

only

such contracts and combinations are within the act as, by reason of intent
or the inherent nature of the contemplated acts, prejudice the public interests
by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the course of trade."
In the recent decision of United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., et al., U. S.
Sup. Ct., Oct. r, 1926, No. 27, (decided Feb.21, 1927) the Supreme Courtfollowed
the Nash case and held that the so-called "rule of reason" laid down in the
Standard Oil case (supra note 17) and American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
221 U. S. 1o6 31 Sup. Ct. 632 (i9IO), had no application to contracts which in
their very nture are illegal, by holding that agreements for price-fixing are ilegal as a matter of law, irrespective of the reasonableness of the prices fixed.
note 27.
SSupra
34
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viously been noted, the doctrine of the Button-Fastenercase, as well
as the Dick Mimeograph case, was expressly repudiated by the
Supreme Court in deciding the Motion Picture Film case.
Any doubt as to whether the decision in the Bement case represented
the existing law has now been clarified by the decision in the General
Electric case." As a result of this decision, the rule has been settled
that the patentee may restrict his licensee as to the prices at which
the latter shall sell the articles which he makes under the license,
but the patentee may not attach to a patented article, whether made
by him or by his licensee, a condition running with the article in the
hands of purchasers, limiting the price at which one who becomes its
owner for full consideration shall part with it.36 Substantially the same
doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court in Bauer v. O'Donnell,7
where it was held that the patentee could not by a mere notice annexed
to the patented article limit the price at which the article may be
resold at retail by a purchaser from jobbers who should have paid to
the licensee (patentee's agent) the full price asked. The Graphophone case,38 as well as Bobbs-Merrill Company v. Straus,"1 the latter
involving the right to fix the price of a copyrighted book, are to the
same effect.
A discussion of price-fixing devices and their relation to the patent
law would not be complete without a reference to the case of
Dr. Miles Medical Company.40 There, the subject matter of the
agreements to maintain a retail price was not a patented article ,but
was a medicine manufactured pursuant to a secret formula. The
petitioner argued that until there had been a disclosure or lawful
discovery of the secret process by the public, the process was entitled
to be protected as a monopoly, and, on the analogy to rights securedby
letters patent, the owner of the process should be permitted to control
4
the pr ces of the product of that process, citing the Bement caseY.
Mr.
Justice Hughes, however, held that the analogy was not applicable,
saying:4
nSupra note 26.
"6The term "license", as used here and subsequently in this discussion, is intended to mean merely the granting of the privilege to exercise some patent
right, which, but for the grant, belongs exclusively to the patentee or licensor,
and
irrespective of whether this grant is made as a part of or in conjunction with a
contract of agency, sale or lease.
In the General E~lectric case, supra note 24, the lcense was oupled with an
agency. The Court considered the case as involving two questions, first, whether
the agency contracts were genuine, and second, whether the license to make, use
and7 vend under the patent was valid,
i. e., not in violation of the Sherman Act.
38
3 Supra note 28.
Supra note 28.
"210
U. S. 339, 28 Sup. Ct. 722 4(igo8).
40
Supra note 28.
Supra note 27.
4220 U. S. 373, 402, 403, 31 Sup. Ct. 376 (1911).
(Italics are the writer's.)
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"Its [the petitioner's] case lies outside the policy of the
patent law, and the extent of the right which that law secures
is not here involved or determined ...
"If a manufacturer, in the absence of statutory privilege, has
the control over the sales of the manufactured article, for which
the complainant here contends, it is not because the process of
manufacture is kept secret. In this respect, the maker of socalled proprietary medicines, unpatented, stands on no different
footing from that of other manufactures."
The court explained that the rights a patentee may enjoy
are derived from statutory grant under the authority conferred by the
Constitution, which is based on public considerations to stimulate
invention.
The abuses of the statutory grant, not only to control prices, but in
the use of the patent as well, was demonstrated in the so-called "Bath
Tub" case." In this case, the government brought suit in equity to
enjoin a combination in restraint of trade in the manufacture and sale
of bath tubs. The combination was effected by a series of trade
agreements and licenses which provided for (i) elimination of articles
known as "second quality;" (2) limiting the time beyond which
deliveries should be made; (3) the regulation of discounts; (4) requiring articles to bear a registered label, and (5) obligating shippers
to resell at not less than fixed prices. The defense was made that the
combination was a reasonable and necessary protection of patent
rights. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the District Court
for Maryland" and held that the agreements "transcended what was
necessary to protect the use of the patent or the monopoly which the
law conferred upon it ... and accomplished a restraint of trade con' 45
demned by the Sherman Act.
In the first United Shoe Machinery case,46 the owners of a number
of patents relating to the manufacture of shoes brought about a
combination of manufacturers and users of shoe machinery by a
system of leases (which included licenses) containing a great variety
of restrictions with respect to the use of the machines. In its petition
to dissolve this combination, the government charged the defendants
with the creation of an unlawful monopoly under the Sherman Act.
The defendants answered that the leases were made in the exercise
of their lawful rights as patentees and "if there is monopoly in them,
it is the monopoly of the right." The Supreme Court dismissed the
petition by a divided court. In the majority opinion, written by
43Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. U. S., supra note 25.
Fed. 172 (D. C. Maryland 19II).
U. S. 20, 48, 33 Sup. Ct. 9 (1912).
"6Supra note 25.
191

"'226
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Mr. Justice McKenna, the case was distinguished from the Motion
Picture Film case 7 and the Graphophonecase, 48 on the ground that
in these latter cases there had been a transfer of title, whereas in the
Shoe Machinery case there was no transfer of title by reason of the
employment of leases. The majority court also held that the combination was unlike that involved in the Bath Tub case49 saying: °
"Of course, there is restraint in a patent. Its strength is in
the restraint, the right to exclude others from the use of the invention, absolutely or on the terms the patentee chooses to
impose. This strength is the compensation which the law
grants for the exercise of invention. Its exercise within the field
covered by the patent law is not an offense against the AntiTrust Act. In other circumstances it may be, as in Standard
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, to which the
case at bar has no resemblance."
The court then advanced these views with respect to patent rights: '
"A patentee is given rights to his device, but he is given no
power to force it on the world. If the world buy it or use it the
world will do so upon a voluntary judgment of its utility, demonstrated, it may be, at great cost to the patentee. If its price be
too high, whether in dollars or conditions, the world will refuse
it; if it be worth the price, whether of dollars or conditions,
the world will seek it. To say that the world is not recompensed
for the price it pays is to attack the policy of the law, is to defy
experience and to declare that the objects of inventive genius
all around us have contributed nothing to the advancement of
mankind."
This laissez faire attitude would seem to be equally appropriate
in considering any commodity, irrespective of any special privilege
under letters patent. It would also seem to harmonize fairly well
with the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Holmes in the Dr. Miles case. 52 The provisions of section 3 of the
'73Supra note 24.
449Supra note 28.
Supra note 25.

10247 U. S. 32, 57, 38 Sup. Ct. 473 (1918).
11247 U. S. 32, 65. 38 Sup. Ct. 473 (1918).
52220 U. S. .373, 411, 412, 31 Sup. Ct. 376 (rii)

where Mr. justice Holmes
said: "I think that, at least, it is safe to say that the most enlightened judicial
policy is to let people manage their own business in their own way, unless the
ground for interference is very clear. ...
I think that we greatly exaggerate the
value and importance to the public of competition in the production or distribution of an article (here it is only distribution), as fixing a fair price. What
really fixes that is the competition of conflicting desires. ...
I cannot believe
that in the long run the public will profit by this court permitting knaves to cut
reasonable prices for some ulterior purpose of their own and thus to impair, if
not to destroy, the production and sale of articles which it is assumed to be desirable that the public should be able to get."
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Clayton Act were enacted to change the rule announced in the first
Shoe Machinery case."
In a government suit in the District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, Judge Dickinson has stated the problem which
arises with respect to the rights under the patent law and the wrongs
condemned by the Sherman Law in the following languageM
"We have, therefore, to determine the limits of a right and a
wrong which seem to overlap each other. It is the right of a
patentee, through having the exclusive sale of the patented
article, to control, and in that sense, to monopolize, the trade in
it. It is wrong by any illegal restraint of trade to monopolize
It cannot have been intended to make
it, or any part of it ....
it unlawful to acquire that the right to which the law has conferred. On the other hand ... it cannot be that the grant of a
patent right confers a license to do that which the law condemns.....

"The solution of the problem is to be sought by finding the
special field of operation of each of these laws. There is a field of
trade, the sole occupancy of which may be in a patentee. Here
he is supreme, and the keeper of the gate of entrance. There
is another field which is in the common occupancy of all. Where
the law has given the whole field to a patentee, with the express right of exclusion of others, and the use of the power of
the law to enforce the exclusion, it is unthinkable that such
exclusion is an illegal restraint of trade. Where the field, however, is open to all, competition for trade is likened to a race in
which all may enter, but in which there must be no unfair
jostling or hampering of others. Each one is free to exert all
his powers, and distance, if he can, all competitors, and win all
the prizes; but he must run fairly and accord to others a like
freedom. If he possesses a patented device which will aid him
in the race, he may use it, as he may use any other form of
property; but he must put it only to its proper use, and if he
uses it as a weapon to disable a rival contestant, or to drive him
from the field, he cannot justify such use, because of his patent
5

3Supra note 15. Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides:
"That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, inthe courseof
such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or
unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any
Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other
place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged therefor,
or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the
goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. (Italics are the writer's.)
4U.S.v. Motion Picture Patents Co. et al., 225 Fed. 800, 805, 8o6 (D. C. E. D.
Pa. 1915).
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right, except to the extent of protecting his exclusive right.
". . The legality of such a contract is determined by the
judgment of whether, in its whole scope and legal intendment,
it is fairly limited in its operation to the proper field of trade
belonging to the patentee, and whether any farther advantages which flow to him are fairly incidental, and are not the
evil fruit of unfair practices employed to restrain the right of
others to a share of the common trade.....
"
Surely, this language cannot be read without arriving at the
conclusion that, after all, when properly understood, there is no
real conflict between the patent law and the Sherman Act. The
so-called conflict is not so much a conflict of the laws themselves as
it is a difficulty in determining the rights which are granted by a
patent and those outside of these rights, which are, of course, subject
to the general law. A conflict arisesonly when the patent law and rights
granted under it are used as a guise or device to conceal a combination
which in its very nature violates the Sherman Act. But this cannot be
said to be a conflict of laws in any true sense. It is nothing more than
a stratagem to circumvent the law.
As an aid to eliminate possible confusion in construing the two
statutes under consideration, it may be appropriate at this point to
make the following observations:
(a)With reference to the patent law: 5
(i) The scope of every patene is limited to the invention described
in the claims contained in it, read in the light of the specifications.
Apatent must be considered in much the same manner as a description
in a deed, which sets the bounds to the grant which it contains.
Thus, reference must be made to the claims of every patent to determine what the invention is, since nothing can be claimed beyond
them.
(2)
The patentee receives nothing from the law which he did not
have before the patent grant, and the only effect of his patent is to
restrain others from manufacturing, using or selling that which he
has invented. The patent law simply protects the patentee in the
monopoly of that which he has invented and described in the claims
of his patent.
(3)The primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation
of private fortunes for the owners of patents, but is "to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts."
uThese rules are indicated by Mr. Justice Clarke in the Motion Picture Film
23 at .5o.

case, supra note
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(b) With reference to the Sherman Act:
(i) The underlying philosophy on which it was enacted is that the
preservation of the competitive system in industry and trade is best
for the welfare of the American people.
(2)
The Act is purely a criminal law. The first and second sections
of the Act condemn as misdemeanors, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, all contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint
of interstate and foreign trade and commerce, and all monopolies of,
or attempts to monopolize such trade and commerce.
(3) The provisions of section 4, conferring on the federal courts
equity jurisdiction "to prevent and restrain" violations of the Act,
constitute a statutory exception to the general rule that equity will
not interfere to enjoin the commission of a crime.
III
Obviously, there remain unsettled many questions in the relation
of the patent law to the Sherman Act.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in the General Electric
case,r6 as previously stated, has to a certain extent clarified the law
as to the right of a patentee to restrict the prices at which his licensee
shall sell the articles made under the license. In this case the court
also found that the Electric Company, owner of the patent, had genuine agency agreements with two classes of distributors of electric
lamps. Under such circumstances, in the absence of any effort by the
patentee to fasten upon the subsequent ownership of the lamps a
control of the prices at which his purchaser shall resell, the court said
it made no difference how widespread his monopoly, because its
extent in the article sold and in the territory of the United States
where sold is not limited in the grant of the patent.
The attempt to apply the decision in the General Electric case,
supra, to other situations may present perplexing questions with
reference to the extent to which the right to control prices may be
justified under the patent monopoly. In this connection, of course,
it must be noted that there is a substantial difference between (a) an
agreement which grants the exclusive right, given by the patent law,
67
to sell a patented article, and (b) a sale of the patented article itself.
With reference to agreements granting exclusive rights given by the
patent law, it has also long been settled that the three exclusive
rights granted by this law, to wit, (i) to make, (2) to use, and (3) to
16Supra note 26.
5
7Ford Motor Co. v. Union Motor Sales Co., 225 Fed. 373, 378 (D. C. S. D.
Ohio, '914); aff'd 244 Fed. 156 (C.C.A. 6th 1917).
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vend, may be conveyed separately. 58 Arrangements designed to
control prices relate to only the third of these three rights.
Further attempts may be made to establish arrangements, presumably in conjunction with agency agreements, whereby the
patentee may undertake to delegate the right to fix prices. In such
a situation the element of control over the patent becomes important.
If the patentee assigns absolutely the right to vend, retaining only
the right to make and use, either in whole or in part, it seems clear
that thereafter the patentee may not legally become a party to a pricefixing agreement. But if the patentee assigns the right to vend,
so that this right shall be shared by the assignee and the patentee,
then an agreement between them for the maintenance of prices may
be said to have been made pursuant to the patent right which covers
them both, and the agreement is valid.sa It must be borne in
mind, of course, that all such arrangements between a patentee and
an assignee covering the right to vend (i. e., a license to sell) will
always be subject to the limitation that they shall not exceed what
is "reasonably necessary for the protection of the patent."59 The
attainment of this limitation, necessarily, will have to depend on the
particular facts of each case. In many cases, it is safe to assume,
there will be presented the fundamental question, previously discussed,
whether the patentee, having an exclusive right to sell, has, by
contract, conferred that right either wholly or in part, or has he done
something of such a character that it involves other rights vested in
the public, either by the common law or by statute.60
6Adams v. Burks, 17 Wall. 453 (U. S. 1873).

axIn the General Electric case (supra,note 26) the court said: "The owner of
a patent may assign it to another and convey (i) the exclusive right to make,
use and vend the invention throughout the United States or (2) an undivided part
or share of that exclusive right or (3) the exclusive right under the patent within
and through a specific part of the United States. But any assignment or transfer
short of one of these is a license giving the licensee no title in the patent and no
right to sue at law in his own name for an infringement. Waterman v. Mackenzie,
138 U. S. 252, 255 II Sup. Ct. 334 (189o); Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477, 494,
495 (185o); Moore v. Marsh, 7 Wall. 515, (1868); and Crown Company v. Nye
Tool Works, 261 U. S. 24, 30 43 Sup. Ct. 25th (1923). Conveying less than title
to the patent or part of it, the patentee may grant a license to make, use and
vend articles under the specifications of his patent for any royalty or upon any
condition the performance of which is reasonably within the reward which the
patentee by the grant of the patent is entitled to secure. It is well settled, as
already said, that where a patentee makes the patented article and sells it, he can
exercse no future control over what the purchaser may wish to do with the
after his purchase. Ithaspassedbeyondthescopeofthepatentee'srights."
article
9
Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States, supra note 25.
60
Ford Motor Company v. Union Motor Sales Co., supra note 57, at 376,
where Hollister, J. said: ".... If what the omplainant has done, or attempted to
do, by these contracts with its dealers, amounts to something more than the
exercise of the exclusive right to sell, it has by such act, added to and extended its
exclusive right to sell, and has thereby brought itself within the condemnation
rules and laws established and enacted for the protection of the public against
monopolies and contracts in restraint of trade."
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Another question which may not be finally settled involves the
extent to which a patent covering a small but essential part of a larger
machine, for example, a carburetor for a gasoline engine, may be
used to justify the control of the right to use or sell the machine, as
a whole. Possibly, in such a situation, adaptation might be made of
the rule stated in the Motion Picture Film case,6 which condemns a
restriction of the use of a patented article with an unpatented accessory. Thus far, it is not believed this particular situation has been
squarely presented in any of the decided cases.
Combinations between licensors or licensees of patents where the
effect is a restraint of interstate trade have been dealt with to some
extent in the Bath Tub case 6in the Supreme Court and in the Motion
Picture Patents cases in the District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, to both of which cases reference has been made.
This question has also been considered in two cases in the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In Rubber Tire Wheel
Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co.," the court held that a combination between the owner of a single patent and eighteen licensees did
not violate the Sherman Act, because it was found that none of the
provisions of the license agreements "touched any matter outside the
monopoly under the patent." The theory applied was that since
the owner of the patent could control prices and output by virtue
of his patent monopoly, there was no injury to the public and no
restraint of commerce if that same result, i. e., the control of prices
and output, was accomplished by the patentee and his licensees
acting under agreement. Concurrently with this decision, the same
court held, in Indiana Manufacturing Co. v. J. I. Case Threshing
Machine Co.," that a system of license agreements covering a number
of patents, all owned by one corporation, which required the licensees
to sell at stated prices and to pay royalties, did not violate the
Sherman Act. Here one of the attacks made on the system was
because of the large number of licensees. The court found, however,
that the number resulted "without any concert of action on the part
of the licensees."
In Pattersonv. United States,66 it was said:
"...
If two or more persons in no way interested in a patent
were to conspire in restraint of the interstate trade or commerce
of an infringer, no one would contend that the conspiracy was
61

62
Supra note 24.
Supra note 25.
6Supra note 53.
"154 Fed. 358 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907). See also Goshen Rubber Works v. Single
Tube Automobile and Bicycle Tire Company, 166 Fed. 431 (C.C. A. 7th 19o8).
6I54 Fed. 365 (C. C. A. 7th 1907).
6222 Fed. 599 (C. C. A. 6th 1915).
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not covered by the statute [the Sherman Act]. No moreisit opento
contend that a conspiracy by a patentee and another, or by the
officers and agents of a patentee in his interest, to restrain the interstate trade or commerce of an infringer, is notwithinthe statute.
The intent of the statute was to sweep away all conspiracies in
restraint of such trade or commerce, whatever their character
may be. The statute respects the monopoly of the patentee.
It to no extent invades the rights conferred upon him by his
patent.... But the right to conspire with another or others in
his interest in restraint of the interstate trade or commerce
covered by his patent is not one of the rights conferred thereby,
and such a conspiracy is within the statute."
The legality of pooling of patents, where the result is a monopoly
in a particular line of trade in which the pooled patents are essential,
has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court. It may be recalled
that in the opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham in theBement ease, 67 the
court took particular pains to point out that the referee had found
that the contracts relating to the patents involved in that case had
been entered into by only the parties to the suit, and had not been
entered into by other parties, nor that they constituted a combination
of more, if not all, of the persons or corporations engaged in the
business concerning which the agreements between the parties to the
suit were made. The court said: "If such similar agreements had
been made, and if, when executed, they would have formed an illegal
combination within the Act of Congress, we cannot presume inthe
absence of any findings to that effect, that they were made and
became effective as an illegal combination .... We are not called
upon to express an opinion upon a state of facts not found." Similarly, in the Motion Picture Film case, 8 Mr. Justice Holmes, in his
dissenting opinion, made it clear that he was not considering the
case as "if the question were upon the effect of a combination of
patents such as would be contrary to the policy that I am bound to
accept from the Congress of the United States."
In Blount ManufacturingCompany v. Yale & Tozime Manufauring
Company,6" two competing manufacturing companies entered into
separate contracts providing for the establishment of a plan for the
use of two competing patents, involving maintenance of prices,
pooling of profits and elimination of competition. The court criticized
and distinguished the two decisons of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in the Rubber Tire and Threshing Machine
6Supra note 27, at 94, 95.
8Supra note 23, at 521.
89166 Fed. 555 (D. C. Mass. 19o9).
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cases, referred to above, and held that the contracts violated the
Sherman Act, saying:
"A contract whereby the manufacturers of two independent
patented inventions agree not to compete in the same commercial field, deprives the public of the benefits of competition,
and creates a restraint of trade which results, not from the
granting of letters patent, but from agreement....
"The Sherman Act is not inconsistent with any rights acquired by the patentee when it prevents agreements in restraint
of trade which are not designed to make valuable the right to
use. There is no inconsistency between the grant of an exclusive
and assignable right to make, use and vend, and the prohibition
of an agreement restraining or suppressing the sale of the article
in interstate commerce, because any profit from such an agreement70does not arise from the value of making, using and vending.
This- same question was considered in National Harrow Co. v.
Hench,n in which it was said:
"The fact that the property involved is covered by letters
patent is urged as a justification; but we do not see how any
importance can be attributed to this fact. Patents confer a
monopoly as respects the property covered by them, but they
confer no right upon the owners of several distinct patents to
combine for the purpose of restraining competition and trade.
Patented property does not differ in this respect from any other.
The fact that one patentee may possess himself of several
patents, and thus increase his monopoly, affords no support for
an argument in favor of a combination by several distinct owners
of such property to restrain manufacture, control sales, and
enhance prices."
In view of the common practice of competing manufacturers to
exchange cross licenses covering their respective patents, frequently
for the purpose of settling possible infringement, the argument may
be made that trade is promoted, and not restrained, when the owner
of one patent monopoly permits his monopoly to be shared by another
70

1n the concurring opinion of Grosscup, C. J., in Indiana Manufacturing
Company v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., (supra note 65), 372, it was said:
"The patents as an entirety, therefore, constitute a single mechanical evolution
-are blossoms from the same trunk-and in no sense are competitive patents;
from which it follows that their concentration in one control is in no sense a
combination to prevent competition." (Italics are the writer's.) The decisions of
the C.C. A., 7thCir.in theRubber Tire andThreshingMachine cases are severely
criticized by Gladney, Restraints of Trade in Patented Articles (I9io), 315 to 365.
7183 Fed. 36, 38 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1897). (Italics are the writer's.)

PATENT LAW AND ANTI-TRUST LAWS
owner of a similar monopoly.72 Probably no one would contend that
such an arrangement, without more, would be unlawful. But if this
mutual exchange of patent rights is coupled with an arrangement
which carries with it an agreement fixing the amount of royalty to be
charged licencees of the combined patents, provides for division of
territory, limitation on production, as well as other restrictions, all
of which have the effect of restraining interstate trade in a product
used so extensively that it directly affects the public interest, then,
it may be urged that pooling of patents is calculated to concentrate
in the hands of the parties to the patent pool such a power to interfere
with interstate trade and commerce that it should be enjoined, in accordance with the precedents to be found in the Reading case" and the
Standard Oil case.74
7
2In the Blount case, supranote 69, 557, 562, the court also said this: "Whether
a patentee may not lawfully make such a license agreement in consideration of
the making of a like license agreement by another patentee is a somewhat interesting question. If, as a result of mutual licenses, there is put upon the market an
article embodying the invention of both patentees, so that as the effect of exchange of licenses a new article of commerce is developed, it is doubtful if the
public is thereby unlawfully deprived ofany of its rights or expectations of free
competition. Where, however, each patentee continues to make his own goods
under his own patents, and seeks to enhance his profits by an agreement with
competitors, who make either patented or unpatented articles, then it seems to
follow that the agreement of each to restrain his own trade cannot be regarded
merely as an incident to the assignment of patent rights. The patentee then
restrains his own trade, not for the purpose of enhancing the value of the license
which he grants, but for the purpose of enhancing thevalue of his trade byremoving competition. A sale or license, with a covenant not to compete, made as an
ordinary incident to enhance the value of the thing conveyed, is not within the

Sherman Act. .

.

.

Combinations between owners of independent patents,

whereby, as part of a plan to monopolize the commercial field, competition is
eliminated, are within the Sherman Act, for the reason that the restraint of trade
or monopoly arises from combination, and not from the exercise of rights granted
by letters patent." See also Strait v. National Harrow Co., I8 N. Y. Supp. 224
(Supreme Ct. N.Y., Special Term i891); National Harrow Co. v. Quick, 67 Fed.
667 (C. C. E. D. Pa. I896), affirmed 83 Fed. 37 (C. C. A. 3rd 1897).
7U.
S. v. Reading Co., et al. 253 U. S. 26, 40 Sup. Ct. 425 (1920).
7
4U. S. v. Standard Oil C. 221 U.S. 1,31 Sup. Ct. 502 (191I). See also Mines v.
Scrivner, 147 Fed. 927 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. i9o6), in which combinations of owners
of copyrights are considered; United States v. New Departure Manufacturing
Company, 204 Fed. 107 (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1913); Vulcan Powder Co. v. Hercules
Powder Co., 96 Cal. 5IO (1892), cited in United States v. Trenton Potteries
Company (supranote 32); State v. Creamery Package Co., rio Minn. 415, 126
N. W. 126 (191o); United Shoe Machinery Co. v. LaChapelle, 212 Mass. 467,
99 N. E. 289 (1912), in which it was said: "It is fairly inferable from the averments of the answer and the offer of proof that the constituent competing companies out of which the plaintiff was formed each own valuable patents for
machines used in the making of footwear. Therefore the further question arises
whether a combination among several Patentees of competing devices is within the
inhibition of the statute. There is no decision by the United States Supreme Court
covering this point, although there is an intimation in Bementv.National Harrow
Company, 186 U. 5. 70, 94, 22 Sup. Ct. 747 (1902), to the effect that such a
combination may be illegal under certain circumstances." (Italics are the
writer's.) Pooling of patents has been discussed to some extent by the following:
BEACH, MONOPOLIES AND INDUSTRIAL TRUSTS (1898), sec. 175; I, TIEDEMAN,
STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1900), 412; II, PAGE
ON
CoNTRACTs
(I920),
II. sec. 826; see also VAUGHAN, ECONOMICS OF QUa PATENT
(1925) ch.
SYSTEM
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IV
In at least two recent prosecutions by the government under the
Sherman Act, in cases where patents are involved, there have arisen
questions affecting the scope and validity of patents. 75 The right
of the government to allege and prove facts relating to these issues
has been resisted on the ground that when this is permitted in an antitrust suit, it constitutes a collateral attack on the patents. In both of
the cases, decisions on this issue have been rendered in favor of the
government. In one case, the decision was without an opinion, but
76
in the other the court said:
"Obviously, this is not a suit by the United States to cancel
patents. It is probably beyond the scope of all possible issues
to decree certain patents or certain claims thereto to be void.
The issue here is whether or not defendants have organized
and are members of an illegal conspiracy and a final decree
can probably not have any broader scope. These expressions
are not to be taken as a final determination of any such question.
However, assuming they correctly state the law, it would still
appear that the allegations of the bill are proper and that
testimony in support thereof might be received. . . . I can perceive many combinations in violation of the Sherman AntiTrust Law in which patents or claims thereto, invalid in view
of the prior art, or limited in nature, may be wrongfully used in
building up or maintaining such an illegal conspiracy .
The purpose of an attack on the scope and validity of patents by
the government in an anti-trust suit is not to affect the patents, as
such, and., ordinarily, the decision rendered in any such case would
contain no provision directly affecting the patents. But, since the
patent law, as we have seen, is an exception to the general rule of law
which prohibits monopolies, it would seem that in a case to enjoin an
unlawful monopoly, it is entirely proper to allege and prove the
limited scope of the monopoly, which is excepted from the operation
of the anti-trust laws, or to show that, as a matter of fact and law,
there is no valid exception, as claimed, because of disclosures in the
prior art, anticipation by earlier patents or because of fraudulent
acts in procuring the patent.
V
While it has been said that, when properly construed, there is no
real conflict of law, in a true sense, between the patent statute and the
75U. S. v. Standard Oil Company (Indiana), et al., now pending in U. S. D. C.
E. D. Ill. E. Div., and U. S. v. Porcelain Appliance Corporation et al., now pending in U. S. D. C. N.D. Ohio, E. Div.
76U. S. v. Porcelain Appliance Corporation, et al., supra note 75, decision by
Judge Westenhaver, Sept. 9, 1926.
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Sherman Act, because the patent monopoly, which provides protection
for a new invention in order that the inventor may have his just
reward, is an exception to the rule against monopolies, nevertheless
the question still remains, what is a proper construction of these laws;
This question, of course, is always present in connection with any
statute which contains broad provisions, such as the right to "make,
use and vend" found in the patent statute, and the terms "any
contract" and "monopoly" which occur in the Sherman Act. Troublesome questions, therefore, will continue to be raised as to what
constitutes a "use" and when does a contract "restrain", or a combination "monopolize." The only real guides in solving these
questions are the precedents laid down by the courts and the conclusions which may logically be drawn from them.
There have been cases in which the courts have declined to follow
the precedent established many years before, prompted often by a
realization of changed economic conditions and circumstances since
the precedent was made. This is believed to have occurred in construing the patent law, and in an aspect which bears directly on the
relation of that law to the Sherman Act.
As was pointed out earlier in this discussion, in the Motion Picture
Film case7 7 the Supreme Court refused to follow the precedent which
that court had established in the Dick case78 and repudiated the
Button-Fastener case,79 which for more than twenty years, it was
believed, represented a correct statement of the law with reference
to the right to restrict the use of a patent. It may be helpful, therefore, to consider what induced the court to reverse itself and adopt a
different attitude when construing the provision of the patent statute,
affecting the use of a patent.
The theory in the Button-Fastvnercase was that the buyer of the
patented machine obtained title to the materials embodying the
invention, subject to a reverter in case of violation of the conditions
of the sale, that is, that the machine should be used only with fasteners made by the seller of the machine. Furthermore, the court
argued, the exclusive right of use granted by letters patent was
granted in derogation of the common right, being a property right"
conferred by statute. It was said that this right was one "which the
public is under obligation to respect and protect."180 It was recognized, to be sure, that there were limitations upon the patentee's
power to contract with reference to the use of his invention by others,
because the property right of a patentee is, after all, but a property
77Supra note
9Supra note

24.
22.

78

8

Supra note 23.

Supra note 22, at 291.
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right, and, as all other property, is subject to the general law of the
land. 81 The court also recognized that the use would be subject to
the restraints imposed by the police power of the states. But apparently the limitations thus recognized to exist at some undefined
point were not considered reached in that case.
With respect to the economic aspects of the new invention involved in the Buton-Fastenercase, the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit considered that the ability to engross the market
would be a legitimate consequence of the meritorious character of
the invention, and that such monopolies would result whenever a
new and surprising advance was made in some art of wide and
general use. It was urged that the great consuming public would be
benefited rather than injured, for the monopoly would continue so
long only as the commodity was supplied ataless price than had prevailed before the invention. The comment was made that, as a
result of the particular invention in the Button-Fastenercase, there
would be created a large market for wire staples, and the supply of
staples, adapted to the new demand, would become a matter of
moment to those engaged in the business of making wire button
fasteners. It followed, therefore, that the restriction on the use of
the patented machine merely brought to the patentee the profit to
which he might claim to be entitled, resulting from the sale of staples
for use with his machine. This, the court held, was justified on the
principle that the monopoly in the unpatented staples would depend
upon the merit of the patented device and resulted as an incident
from the monopoly in the use of the invention, and was, therefore,
legitimate. The court said:8 2 "Depending, as such a monopoly
would, upon the merits of the invention to which it is a mere incident,
it is neither obnoxious to public policy, nor an illegal restraint of
trade."
The same principle was applied by the Supreme Court in the Dick
case, the opinion being written by Mr. Justice Lurton, who as a
Circuit Judge had written the opinion in the Button-Fastenercase.
Mr. Chief Justice White, Mr. Justice Hughes and Mr. Justice Lamar
dissented. In the course of his dissenting opinion, Mr. Chief Justice
White explained the reasons constraining him to dissent to be:83
-first, to suggest that the application of the rule might be confined
within narrow limits in future cases, and, second, to make it clear
that if evils resulted from the continuation of the rule, it would result
froth inaction of the legislative department in failing to amend the
8Supra note

22, at 293.
4Supra note 23, at 50.

8Supra note 22, at 296.
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statute so as to avoid such evils. The real point of dissent, of course,
was that the rule of the Dick case permitted a patent to be extended
to things which it did not include.
In 1917, when the Motion Picture Film case" came before the
Supreme Court, the personnel of the court had changed to some
extent, and it was realized that, with the development of the corporate
form of conducting large business enterprises, in which there could
be included in one ownership the manufacture and sale of several
lines of goods, the evils resulting from the doctrine of thd ButtonFastenercase and the Dick case were manifest; Mr. Justice Clarke
pointed out the legitimate distinction between the rights granted
-under a patent and those created by a patentee by private contract,
which led to the court's refusal to follow the rule of the former cases.
By way of preliminary explanation of this change of attitude on the
part of the court he said:"
"It was not until the time came in which the full possibilities
seem first to have been appreciated of uniting, in one, many
branches of business through corporate organization and of
gathering great profits in small payments, which are not realized
or resented, from many, rather than smaller or even equal
profits in larger payments, which are felt and may be refused,
from a few, that it came to be thought that the 'right to use
* * * the invention' of a patent gave to the patentee or his assigns the right to restrict the use of it to materials or supplies
not described in the patent and not by its terms made a part
of the thing patented."
In other words, the court recognized that large corporate enterprises, owners of patents, would be organized to carry on business
in several associated and related articles, in which not only a patented
machine, but also the articles used with that machine, could. be
manufactured and sold by the same owners. And if such owner could
fix the prices of the materials, accessories to the patented machine,
merely because he owned a patent covering the machine withwhich
they were to be used,it was obvious that the monopoly, thus permitted,
might be extended to alarming proportions.
A further ground for the change of attitude indicated in the Motion
Picture Film case with reference to the right to restrict the use,
claimed under the patent law, was the fact that in the situation there
presented the patented device was the only one with which moion
picture films could be used successfully. Accordingly, it was recognized that, unless a limit was placed on the right to restrict the use
uSupra note 24.
ESupra note.24 at 513.
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of the patented article, the ability of the owner of the patent to exert
a great control in one of the large industries would be a serious
matter. 81 If, in a given case, it should appear that there remain in
the industry other patented instruments, all of which are successful
and available to competitors, the court may reach an entirely different
87
decision.
No change has been made in the provisions of the section of the
patent statute relating to the monopoly grant since 1870. On the
other hand, the Sherman Act, passed in i89o, was supplemented in
1914 by the Clayton Act, which, as has previously been indicated,
contained a section extending the prohibition of contracts and leases
"substantially lessening competition" or "tending to create a monopoly" specifically to "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
' 's
supplies 6r other commodities, whether patented or unpatented."
It was pointed out by Mr. Justice Day in the second Shoe Machinery
case89 that this provision in the Clayton Act was inserted "with the
express purpose of preventing rights granted by letters patent from
securing immunity from the inhibitions of the act." It will also be
recalled that in the first Shoe Machinery case substantially the same
leases were attacked under the Sherman Act as were attacked in the
second Shoe Machinery case, but the leases were sustained as valid in
the first case because "within the rights of holders of patents." When
the combination under the leases came before the court a second time,
in view of the change in the anti-trust statutes, the constitutionality of
which was questioned, the court said: 90 "The patent grant does not
limit the right of Congress to enact legislation not interfering with the
legitimate rights secured by the patent but prohibiting in the public
interest the making of agreements which may lessen competition and
build up monopoly."
It, therefore, remains to be seen whether in the further exploitation of patents in the hands of owners, organized as large corporate
enterprises, or a combination of corporate enterprises, serving nation"Motion Picture Patents Company v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.,
** * If these restrictions were sustained plainly the plaintiff might, for its own
profit or that of its favorites, by the obviously simple expedient of varying its
royalty charge, ruin anyone unfortunate enough to be dependent upon its confessedly important improvements for the doing of business."
BFord Motor Co. v. Benjamin E. Boone, Inc., 244 Fed. 335, 343 (C. C. A.
9th, 1917); Cf. United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 251 U. S. 417,
40 8Sup. Ct. 293 (1919).
889Clayton Act, supra, note 15, § 3.
Supra note 25 at 460.
90Supra note 25 at 464.

Supra, note 24, 515, where Mr. Justice Clarke said:
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wide, as well as international markets, and dealing in a commodity
which in this scientific age 9' affects the daily life of a substantial

proportion of the people, either the courts or Congress, in the interest
of preserving free trade and commerce, may find it necessary, to
impose additional specific limitations on the exceptional monopoly
which is granted to the inventor, that he may enjoy the fruit of his
labors. Congress found it necessary to restrict the use of patents in the
enactment of the Clayton Act. And practically contemporaneously
with this legislation, but independently of it, the Supreme Court imposed a similar restriction, 12 pointing out that "the primary purpose of
our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of
patents." If additional modifications are made in the patent grant
fornew inventions, either by the courts or by Congress, itis reasonable
to expect that such modifications will be designed to restrict the
commercial exploitation of patents, especially by assignees thereof,
while, at the same time, affording reasonable reward to the inventor,
in order that genius may continue "to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts.93 '"
91
According to The Official Gazette of the United States Patent Office for
March, 15, 1927, there have been issued 1,621,485 patents. During the year
1926 alone there were issued 44,750 patents.
9Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., supra note 24.
9In the General Electric case, (supra note 26),the court held, as previously
indicated, that a patentee may limit the method of sale and the price mi connection with licenses to sell under the patent, but added a proviso as follows:
i.s . provided the conditions of sale are normally and reasonably adapted to
secure pecuniary rewardfor the patentee's monopoly." (Italics are the writer's.)
And in Blount Mianufacturing Company v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing
Company, (supranote 69) 56I, the court said: "The suppression of intellectual
products for the preservation of the old market does not promote the progress of
science and the arts. A patentee who agrees to suppress his invention is not
promoting it. He is not deriving his profit from its promotion, but from manipulation of the market. It is no part of the constitutional scheme, or of the
scheme of thepatent laws, to secure to inventors a profit from the suppression
of their creations." See also WALKER ON PATENTS (5th edition 1917) § 153.

